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SOCIAL MEDIA AND CONFLICT MAPPING IN SYRIA: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACEMAKING, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND FOR TRC PROCESSES 
Paul J. Zwier∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Early 2015 evidenced the first signs that Syria may soon be facing a transition 
from its present form of government into a new transitional government following 
the end of its civil war. Ideally, the transitional period will provide Syria with a 
secure and principled basis for governing until a full constitutional process can be 
employed and will also start the process of Syria’s taking steps forward toward 
healing and reconciliation between the parties. Toward the later end, the 
transitional period will require Syrian peacemakers to select among options for 
how to best deal with past atrocities committed by the parties in pursuit of their 
war aims. This Article reviews five of these options and argues that Syrians should 
adopt a mix of formal judicial proceedings for those it does not grant amnesty to in 
order to get a peace agreement, and an informal yet principled mediation process 
during a transitional period for disputes that arise from the actions of rebel group 
activities. These later disputes should be followed by a process with a hybrid court 
for those who do not gain adequate resolution of their disputes through the 
informal mediation process.  
This Article also argues that the incorporation and strategic use of social 
media postings by Syrians into conflict mapping projects presents important 
possibilities for providing the proof needed for assessing an individual’s criminal 
responsibility and a way for Syria to make a meaningful trade between seeking 
justice for past criminal wrongdoing and providing reconciliation between parties 
at an informal local level. Even if no peace transition is actually constituted in 
Syria, this Article should be useful in providing an analysis of transitional options 
for similar countries in the Middle East in a process of transitioning from a 
dictatorship to a democratic form of government.  
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, Director, Emory Center for Advocacy and 
Dispute Resolution. Consultant with The Carter Center, and other international rule-of-law projects in the 
Middle East, China, Russia, Mexico and Africa since 2005.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Early 2015 evidenced the first signs that Syria may soon be facing a 
transition from its present form of government into a new transitional 
government following the end of its civil war.1 Ideally, the transitional period 
will need to provide Syria with a secure and principled basis for governing 
until a full constitutional process can be employed to bring about a new 
constitution and elections for a new government. It will also start the process 
of Syria’s taking steps forward toward healing and reconciliation between the 
parties. Toward the later end, the transition period will require Syrian 
peacemakers to select among the options for how to best deal with past 
atrocities committed by the parties in pursuit of their war aims. There are five 
options to consider: (1) design a transitional process that removes the current 
leadership of the military and security forces; (2) make little or no provisions 
for dealing with past war crimes on either side; (3) seek the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) to deal with past atrocities; (4) rely on the 
process of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to manage past 
disputes; or (5) rely on its national legal structures to prosecute individuals for 
the commission of their war crimes. The incorporation of social media postings 
by Syrians into conflict mapping projects presents important possibilities for 
support of the fifth option. It may provide a way for Syria to make a 
meaningful trade between seeking justice for past criminal wrongdoing and 
providing reconciliation between parties at an informal local level. 
Part I will review each of these options and argue that Syrians should adopt 
a mix of formal judicial proceedings for those it does not grant amnesty to in 
order to get a peace agreement, and an informal yet principled mediation 
process during a transitional period for disputes that arise from the actions of 
rebel group activities. These later disputes should be followed by a process 
 
 1 See generally Anne Barnard, U.N. Envoy Says Assad is Crucial to Defusing Conflict in Syria, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/world/middleeast/un-envoy-to-syria-says-assad-
is-crucial-to-hopes-to-end-war.html. The U.N. has once again started the process of reviving peace talks, 
which started in Geneva in 2011 and resulted in a second round of talks in 2014. See id. The United States has 
also seemed to drop its demand that Assad leave office, perhaps making more room for a negotiated solution to 
end the conflict. See Anne Barnard & Somini Sengupta, U.S. Signals Shift on How to End Syrian Civil War, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/world/middleeast/us-support-for-syria-
peace-plans-demonstrates-shift-in-priorities.html?_r=0. There are also reports, denied by the Russians, that 
they may abandon their support for the Assad government in exchange for Saudi reduction in oil production. 
Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & David D. Kirkpatrick, Saudi Oil is Seen as Lever to Pry Russian Support from 
Syria’s Assad, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/world/middleeast/saudi-
arabia-is-said-to-use-oil-to-lure-russia-away-from-syrias-assad.html. 
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with a hybrid court for those who do not gain adequate resolution of their 
disputes through the informal mediation process. This option will best deal 
with the lessons learned in other Middle Eastern post-conflict transitions, and, 
while presenting some risks, will also best provide for the need for peace at the 
local level under a transition period that is relatively easy to execute, has a low 
cost, and avoids the glare of publicity. Applying both a pragmatic and yet 
principled criteria (peace first, low cost, easy to execute) will best guide Syria 
as it seeks the stability needed to grow the peace process into its next stage of 
development. 
In Part II, this Article will argue that recent developments in the use of 
social media (with special emphasis on YouTube videos posted on Facebook 
and Twitter, and attached to emails) and the ability of various international 
monitoring groups, including the United Nations (U.N.), to map the conflict in 
Syria will greatly assist the efficacy of the fifth option by not only providing 
the proof needed for assessing an individual’s criminal responsibility, but also 
by making possible a more meaningful informal mediation process. Strategic 
use by the U.N. and its partners of these conflict mapping capabilities presents 
new potentials for realistic reconciliation between individual victims and those 
who have committed criminal atrocities. Even if no peace transition is actually 
constituted in Syria, this Article should be useful in providing an analysis of 
transitional options in similar countries in the Middle East that are also in a 
process of transitioning from a dictatorship to a democratic form of 
government. 
I. OPTIONS FOR POLITICAL TRANSITION IN SYRIA 
Much of what will end up dictating the final choice of which political 
option the Syrians end up choosing will be the result of the conditions for the 
final ending of hostilities. For example, if the parties themselves meet and 
reach a settlement, without interference from the international community or 
regional powerbrokers, the political transition will likely look much different 
than one brokered by either the Russians, or in turn one brokered by the U.N. 
Still, it is important to understand the merits of each option so that the parties 
can be aware of the risks and tradeoffs that are made under each option. After 
disposing of the first three options rather quickly, this Article will explore in 
more depth the other two options that are available if the international 
community, and the U.N. in particular, becomes the broker of the eventual 
peace agreement between the Syrian government and the opposition groups. 
Where the U.N. becomes involved, the dilemmas between making peace and 
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setting up the conditions for transitional justice are more acute. The U.N. as an 
institution has to weigh the future deterrent impact on rogue states if it brokers 
a peace with impunity for past atrocities. It will help explain why the fifth 
option will likely be the option that emerges where the U.N. is involved in the 
peace process. 
A. What to Do with the Syrian Military and Security Forces During the 
Transitional Period—Removing vs. Ignoring 
Syrian decision-makers will be informed by recent events in Iraq, as well as 
the ongoing efforts in transitional governance processes taking place in Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia. Regardless of the power sharing or power transition 
mechanisms the Syrians eventually employ during their transitional period, 
they will face the question of how to best ensure the long-term stability of the 
country without repeating the mistakes of transitions brought about by power-
sharing arrangements with the military. In other words, Syria will need to 
figure out how it will avoid creating the circumstances that now threaten the 
stability of governance structures in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya, if indeed Syrians 
choose to eventually use a democratic form of government. 
Iraq, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia present a wide spectrum of how to best set 
up a transition process after a conflict and regime change. At one end of the 
spectrum is Iraq, which allegedly tried to clean house by removing much of 
Saddam Hussein’s military from the Iraqi military at the end of the war.2 Some 
have made the argument that how the Iraqis dealt with Saddam Hussein’s 
military and security forces in the aftermath of the Iraqi war has led to the 
instability the Iraqis now face.3 A number of former Sunni/Hussein military 
leaders are now involved in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, more 
commonly known as ISIS, having been summarily initially dismissed by the 
 
 2 See Ben Hubbard & Eric Schmitt, Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-
factor-in-isis-successes.html. The article goes on to report what it has learned from conflict mapping of the war 
in Iraq and Syria. “According to a map of the group developed by Mr. Alhashimi, the Iraqi expert, Mr. 
Baghdadi has 25 deputies across Iraq and Syria. About one-third were military officers during Mr. Hussein’s 
rule, and nearly all were imprisoned by American forces.” Id. 
 3 Samia Nakhoul, Saddam's Former Army is the Secret to ISIS Success, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-saddams-former-army-is-secret-of-baghdadis-success-2015-6. “The sec-
tarian approach of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki drove the Sunni minority in Iraq to support any group that 
could reverse its increasing marginalization, which led to Sunni tribal support of the Islamic State.” RICHARD 
BARRETT, SOUFAN GROUP, THE ISLAMIC STATE 5 (2014), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 
10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf.  
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Coalition government.4 Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s 
sectarian and authoritarian policies isolated Sunnis from Iraqi politics, leading 
former military leaders, who Maliki removed from the Iraqi military, to 
support the insurgency.5 Many now criticize the Iraqi government (and the 
U.S.) for not paying adequate attention to what should be done with the over 
ninety thousand mostly-Sunni military personnel during the post-conflict 
transition.6 Some of the Sunni tribal leaders, who had past Iraqi military 
experience, were thereafter formed into a group called “the Awakening” to 
help the United States and Iraqi governments fight Al-Qaeda.7 The Awakening 
forces were paid, trained, and given weapons by the United States.8 Thereafter, 
some of these Sunnis left the Awakening and eventually joined ISIS when they 
felt snubbed and excluded by Maliki’s Shi’a government.9 The lesson from the 
Iraqi experience for peacemaking in Syria may be that the Syrians should not 
take steps to exclude or remove or separately treat all of Assad’s military and 
security forces, and instead consider how to integrate members of opposition 
military groups into the Syrian army or they will potentially form a potent 
force for instability going forward. 
On the other end of the spectrum are the transitional structures used by 
Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in the aftermath of their recent revolutions. In 
Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood negotiated with Egypt’s Supreme Military 
Council after many in the military had grown tired of Hosni Mubarak and 
granted it immunity for any role it played in past atrocities.10 Having granted 
 
 4 See Hubbard & Schmitt, supra note 2 (discussing that several of Saddam Hussein’s former officers 
serve as top military leaders for Abu Bakr al-Bagdahdi); Mark Thompson, How Disbanding the Iraqi Army 
Fueled ISIS, TIME (May 28, 2015), http://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/. 
 5 See Marc Lynch, How Can the U.S. Help Maliki When Maliki’s the Problem?, WASH. POST: MONKEY 
CAGE (June 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/12/iraq-trapped-
between-isis-and-maliki/.  
 6 See Timothy Williams & Duraid Adnan, Sunnis in Iraq Allied with U.S. Rejoin Rebels, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/world/middleeast/17awakening.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0. 
 7 See id.; Zachary Laub & Jonathan Masters, The Islamic State, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL., http://
www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811 (last updated May 18, 2015). 
 8 Williams & Adnan, supra note 6.  
 9 See id.; see also Jonathan Broder, Iraq’s ISIS Fight Could Be a Second Awakening, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 
27, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/02/06/awakening-part-ii-301906.html. Most recently, there are 
reports that some of these same Awakening members are willing to now support the efforts against ISIS by 
forming a new group called the Awakening II. Id.; Laub & Masters, supra note 7.  
 10 See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Egypt, Signs of Accord Between Military Council and Islamists, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/world/middleeast/signs-of-accord-between-
egyptian-military-and-muslim-brotherhood-on-new-charter.html?pagewanted=all. 
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amnesty, it did nothing to remove the military from reasserting power. After a 
brief period of a Muslim Brotherhood-led government, the Egyptian Military 
stepped in and took back control of the country.11 The Military Council has, 
once again, taken control of the country, and has recently taken a series of 
steps that suggest its desires to put stability ahead of democracy.12 The lesson 
appears to be that without sufficient guarantees that the military leadership will 
not reassert itself, Syria will run the risk that the Assad military will return to 
power. 
B. Make No Provision for Dealing with Military or Security Leadership 
In the case of Libya and Tunisia, no provision was made as to how past 
military leadership was to fare during the transitional period. Gaddafi’s 
military was destroyed, making it impossible to restore order during the 
interim period.13 The Libyan failure to try to resurrect or reform a new military 
may have created the sources of instability that have returned the various tribal 
groups to violence.14 On the other hand, in Tunisia, not making express 
accommodations with the military seems to have worked out quite well.15 In 
Tunisia, the existing military tacitly agreed to submit to the decisions of its 
“Constituent Assembly” and confined itself to taking actions against jihadists 
and gasoline traffickers.16 In the Tunisian case, the transitional period only 
provided for a legislative body to rule on any issues that arose during the 
transitional period, and its peace agreement never dealt explicitly with past 
criminal actions by the government. 
Some look to Tunisia for an example of an Islamic State that has resisted 
the forces of radicalism and has continued to hold together as a secular 
democracy that is committed to religious freedom under the auspices of a 
secular Constitution. Again, there are important differences between Syria and 
 
 11 See Daria Solovieva, Egypt’s Military Takes Control over Muslim Brotherhood, Supporters, WASH. 
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/18/egypts-military-takes-control-
over-muslim-brotherh/#ixzz3XUCpoFbQ.  
 12 See id.  
 13 See Simon Tisdall, Muammar Gaddafi’s Violent Death Leaves Libya at a Crossroads, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/20/gaddafi-death-leaves-libya-cross 
roads. 
 14 See NATO Chief Admits Efforts to Stabilize Post-Gaddafi Libya Failed, RT NEWS (May 14, 2015), 
http://www.rt.com/news/258741-nato-admits-libya-fail/. 
 15 Souhail Belhadj, Tunisia: An Exemplary Political Transition? (Sept. 10, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center).  
 16 Id. 
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Tunisia that must be factored into Syria’s case. In Tunisia’s case, its 
transitional period was supported by a strong labor movement, capable of 
shutting down the government if the unions did not like the radical direction of 
some of its more extreme actors.17 Ironically, it was also supported by a 
tradition of a more conservative use of military power in the hands of its 
previously ruling dictator, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.18 Tunisia’s military and 
security services did not have the same tradition, capacity, and reputation for 
dealing ruthlessly and violently against its citizens.19 The Syrians might 
wonder, then, whether the situation in Tunisia is likely to be predictive of the 
results of the transitional structures used by the Tunisians, or whether the 
mostly Alawite security forces would act more like the Egyptian military 
should the leadership in a transition period start to take a turn against them. 
Without a strong labor influence or other social political movement to 
counteract the Syrian military’s involvement, the risks of not dealing directly 
with the military leaders are likely to later derail the transition period. 
C. The War Crimes of Assad’s Military and Security Forces and the 
International Criminal Court 
Should the transitional plan for Syria include an appeal to the ICC, as in 
Liberia and Kenya, in the wake of conflicts there? The transitional government 
that might be negotiated in Syria could include a power-sharing agreement that 
might contain provisions that commit the country to a number of U.N. 
resolutions.20 In the case of Liberia, these resolutions included an agreement 
 
 17 Id.; Sarah Chayes, How a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia’s Political Settlement, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/27/how-leftist-labor-
union-helped-force-tunisia-s-political-settlement. 
 18 See generally LANDRY SIGNE & REMY SMIDA, STAN. CTR. ON DEMOCRACY, DEV., AND THE RULE OF 
LAW, THE ARMY’S DECISION TO REPRESS: A TURNING POINT IN TUNISIA’S REGIME CHANGE (Apr. 2014), 
http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Landry_Final.pdf. 
 19 See id. at 6–7; James Fromson, Tunisia’s Transition, INT’L INST. STRATEGIC STUD. (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2014-b4d9/february-72f2/tunisia-transition-
d9e8 (discussing the neutrality of Tunisia’s military).  
 20 See Associated Press, Syria’s Assad Vows to Comply with UN Resolution, CBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2013), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/syria-s-assad-vows-to-comply-with-un-resolution-1.1872522. Discussion of this 
option in the present historical context may seem somewhat naïve. Why would Assad agree to submit to U.N. 
resolutions when he has not been defeated? On the other hand, Assad did agree to submit to chemical weapons 
inspections when political pressure was applied. He also has denied that he has done anything wrong, and that 
charges that he has used chemical weapons or barrel bombs have been trumped up by the West. Perhaps 
implicit in that denial is a logical trap—that if you have not done anything wrong, why not submit to the U.N. 
resolutions and the ICC’s jurisdiction? Still, great pressure would likely have to be brought to bear on Assad 
and to get him to agree to submit to the ICC. As discussed below, Assad will likely have to be given some sort 
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that past and potential ongoing human rights violations would be submitted 
during the transitional period to the ICC.21 The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) also included a provision that membership in opposition 
military groups would not exclude those members from taking part in the 
political process.22 
The capacity of an international criminal court (first the International 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), then the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for Sierra 
Leone, and now the ICC) to successfully prosecute past heads of state is 
mixed. By 2003, the time of Liberia’s CPA, the ICTY had prosecuted a 
number of government leaders who engaged in war crimes under the Rome 
Statute, including Slobodan Milošević, and so Liberian peacemakers had 
precedent to expect an international prosecution of Charles Taylor.23 After 
getting Kenya to turn over Taylor to the ICC, the ICC secured the conviction 
of Taylor, but did not successfully bring to judgment any other leader in the 
military leadership in Liberia.24 The ICC has since issued warrants for the 
arrest of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir of Sudan25 and Uhuru Kenyatta of 
Kenya.26 This time, the ICC failed to produce convictions of the Presidents, 
though it spurred on successful Kenyan prosecutions of less prominent 
political and military figures.27 The ICC has announced it will no longer 
 
of amnesty. The question remains, then, how many others in the leadership of the government would have to 
be given amnesty, or how many of them might be forced to submit to the ICC. See generally JUDITH S. YAPHE, 
NAT’L DEF. U. CTR FOR STRATEGIC RES., INST. FOR NAT’L STRATEGIC STUDIES, NEXT STEPS IN SYRIA (Dec. 
2013), http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_4-syria/Next_Steps_in_Syria.pdf.  
 21 See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4–8 (Feb. 26, 2011).  
 22 Powersharing Transition Government: Accra Peace Agreement, U. NOTRE DAME KROC INST. FOR 
INT’L PEACE STUDIES, http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/powersharing-transitional-government-accra-
peace-agreement (last visited Nov. 5, 2015); Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of 
Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Aug. 18, 2013, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ 
file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf.  
 23 See Marlise Simons, Ex-President of Liberia Aided War Crimes, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/world/africa/charles-taylor-liberia-sierra-leone-war-crimes-court-
verdict.html. 
 24 See Fred van der Kraaij, Will Charles Taylor End up Being Africa’s Only Former President Convicted 
of War Crimes?, LIBERIAN PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 29, 2013), http://blog.liberiapastandpresent.org/?p=590. 
 25 Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Court at its Seventh Session, Report on the Activities of the Court, ICC-
ASP/7/25 (Nov. 14-22, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP7/ICC-ASP-7-25%20English.pdf. 
 26 LIONEL NICHOLS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE END OF IMPUNITY IN KENYA 82 
(Springer Int’l Publishing 2015).  
 27 Id. at 250.  
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prosecute Uhuru Kenyatta and Omar Bashir because of a lack of cooperation 
from the international community.28 Still, the ICC remains a major force in 
potentially bringing to justice at least some of the country’s leadership for its 
promulgation of war crimes against its civilian population. What will be 
necessary in order to make this happen is either for the Security Council to 
back the ICC’s efforts, or for the Syrians themselves to decide to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
Since the backing of Russia is unlikely,29 the issue is whether the Syrian 
opposition forces can get the Assad government to agree to a transitional 
government without at least giving amnesty to some of its leaders. The ICC 
lacks jurisdiction over Syria, which is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, 
absent the transitional government making a request for its help (like in the 
cases of Liberia and Kenya).30 
The situation for Syrian peacemakers will be made all the more difficult 
because they will face enormous resistance to giving Assad these assurances. 
Such resistance will come from victims and the families of victims of Assad’s 
government’s war crimes. In addition, resistance will come from some 
members of the international community who will likely not be willing to 
support the Syrian transitional period if it appears that the Assad government 
will be granted impunity for any of its past war crimes. The situation in Kenya 
is telling. Following the U.N.-negotiated power-sharing arrangement between 
Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga following the 2007 post-election violence 
between the two’s supporters, the parties had agreed to submit to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction for any violation of the Rome Statute.31 One who was allegedly 
engaged in a violation of the Rome Statute was Kenya’s later-elected 
President, Uhuru Kenyatta. Support for Kenyatta’s government has been a long 
 
 28 Id. at 126, 250. See Adam Taylor, Even at the International Criminal Court, Some Will Always be 
Above the Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/12/
05/even-at-the-international-criminal-court-some-will-always-be-above-the-law/; Sommini Sengupta, Omar 
al-Bashir Case Shows International Criminal Court’s Limitations, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/africa/sudan-bashir-international-criminal-court.html.  
 29 Russia has vetoed other resolutions aimed at Syria. Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and 
China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html?_r=0.  
 30 As of September 2015, Syria has not ratified the Rome Statute. Miriam Morfino, Kenyatta Case at the 
ICC: Three Options Available for the ICC Judges, AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COALITION FOR INT’L 
CRIM. CT. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://amicc.blogspot.com/2014/10/kenyatta-case-at-icc-three-options.html.  
 31 NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 85. 
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time in coming because of his indictment, and that support continues to be 
tepid, despite the ICC dropping its case against him.32 
The legal case against Assad seems strong, should the ICC be granted 
jurisdiction. Assad has now been at war with his own citizens since 2010. He, 
or individuals in his government, are likely responsible for a number of war 
crimes and, at a minimum, have much explaining to do. The United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that close to half of the 
Syrian population (10.8 million out of a country of close to 22 million), has 
been directly affected by violence since the start of the civil war.33 Over six 
million people have been internally displaced.34 Additionally, 3.8 million 
Syrians have already registered as refugees in the UNHCR.35 The organization 
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports that over 200,000 Syrians have 
died in the conflict as of January 1, 2015, 17,790 of whom were civilians and 








 32 Morfino, supra note 30.  
 33 2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile—Syrian Arab Republic, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49e486a76.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2015).  
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Rick Gladstone & Mohammad Ghannam, Syria Deaths Hit New High in 2014, Observer Group Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/world/middleeast/syrian-civil-war-2014-
deadliest-so-far.html?_r=0.  
 37 Id.  
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Syrian Government Bombardment of Opposition-Held Districts in Aleppo
38 
In addition, the Assad government faces allegations for the use of chemical 
weapons against its citizens, and also in its use of barrel bombs,39 which are 
said to kill indiscriminately, and therefore violate standards of humanitarian 
law. There is also substantial evidence that members of the Syrian security 
forces have engaged in torture, unlawful detention, and murder.40 As we will 
see, the evidence for these acts includes the use of publically available social 
media postings;41 most damning is the evidence gained from YouTube videos. 
For Syrians now concerned with how to make peace but not create impunity to 
the Syrian regime for these past acts, the exchange is difficult—which is more 
important, to make peace or secure justice for past victims? They may be 
looking for a different process that will provide sufficient guarantees to some 
 
 38 Syrian Government Bombardment of Opposition-Held Districts in Aleppo, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 
30, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/image/2014/07/30/syrian-government-bombardment-opposition-
held-districts-aleppo.  
 39 Syria: Barrage of Barrel Bombs, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 30, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/
07/30/syria-barrage-barrel-bombs (containing maps with documented evidence of barrel bombs). 
 40 Syria: Political Detainees Tortured, Killed, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2013/10/03/syria-political-detainees-tortured-killed.  
 41 See infra Part II.  
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of the top leadership to end the conflict, but still hold out the possibility of a 
process that will at least shed light on what had been done by the government, 
and why it used forces against its own citizens. 
One possibility would be to turn to the process used by South Africa in its 
transition away from an apartheid government. There, the transition period 
included the use of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).42 The 
South African TRC, therefore, bears a hard look to determine whether its use 
might be appropriate for Syrians. 
D. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
In between the extremes described above (cleaning house and negotiating 
immunity, or effectively giving the military a pass by not taking any action 
against them), some have argued instead for the transitional structures used by 
South Africa.43 In South Africa, the military was not given immunity for past 
war crimes, but South African opposition groups, led by Nelson Mandela, 
agreed to give up on a formal criminal prosecution if the South African 
government agreed to submit to a Truth and Reconciliation process to deal 
with past criminal acts.44 The TRC agreement provided for the possibility of 
amnesty if an individual came forward and told the truth about what 
happened.45 South Africa is often held out as the most successful transition 
between apartheid and democracy as it was able to maintain its military power 
structures, and yet its military eventually succumbed to the authority of its 
President, Nelson Mandela.46 South Africa’s transitional period was 
orchestrated through the legal vehicle of an interim constitution, which set up a 
 
 42 Note that the ICC did not exist at the time of the South African transition. While an international war 
crimes tribunal was a theoretical possibility, South Africa decided to take control of its own process for 
dealing with the past.  
 43 NEL MARAIS & JO DAVIES, DECONSTRUCTING THE CONDITIONS THAT ENABLED SOUTH AFRICA’S 
TRANSITION TO POWER-SHARING 1 (2014) (“This paper has been prepared for the Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre, The Carter Center and Swisspeace for a seminar of ‘The Syria Transition Options project of 
The Carter Center.’”). See also Padraig O’Malley, Record of Understanding 26 September 1992, O’MALLEY 
ARCHIVES (Sept. 26, 1992), https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02046/
05lv02092/06lv02096.htm.  
 44 See Desmond Tutu, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa (TRC), ENCYC. BRITANNICA 
(Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.britannica.com/topic/Truth-and-Reconciliation-Commission-South-Africa.  
 45 See Jay A. Vora & Erika Vora, The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth & Reconciliation 
Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner, and English South Africans, 34 J. BLACK STUD. 301, 302, 305–
06 (2004).  
 46 Id. at 301–07. 
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five-year period of power sharing, but then led to the adoption of a new 
constitutional democracy when F.W. de Klerk resigned in the third year of the 
transitional period and Mandela formed his majority government. The South 
African military stood behind Mandela and submitted to his executive 
authority even though de Klerk resigned.47 Some attribute the success of this 
period to South Africa’s immediate use of its TRC.48 They attribute to the TRC 
the impetus for at least delaying somewhat the African National Congress 
(ANC) and its desire for revenge, and led instead to a gradual reconciliation 
that is still working itself out in South African’s law and politics.49 Could such 
a transition be worked out in Syria between the Assad government and the 
rebel groups? 
1. Potential Difficulties with a TRC in Syria 
International advisors caution Syria on being too quick to hold up the 
relatively successful transitions to democracy that occurred in South Africa 
because of the substantial historical and political differences between Syria and 
the South African situation.50 Syrians might worry that there were a number of 
additional factors that led to the success of the transitional period. First, the 
courage of de Klerk to initially seek out Mandela as a bargaining partner is 
now missing in actions of the Assad government leadership. Second, the South 
African situation is different from Syria’s because of Mandela’s moral 
standing, from which he could make the claim for himself and other victims, 
that South Africa needed peace more than justice. Again, who among the 
Syrian opposition has the standing of Nelson Mandela? Third, Desmond Tutu 
and the church played a significant role in arguing for an end to apartheid. 
Finally, South Africa was uniquely left alone during its transition period, and 
the regional powers in the Middle East are unlikely to follow suit. In the case 
of Syria, there are a number of regional players with various stakes in the 
different groups vying for power. The Iranians are said to have too much to 
lose should Assad fall, as they support the Shia groups and their offshoot, the 
 
 47 MARAIS & DAVIES, supra note 43, at 8–9.  
 48 See generally INDEP. BOARD INQUIRY (IBI), REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1994 (1994), http:// 
www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AG2543/AG2543-2-2-44-01-jpeg.pdf.  
 49 MARAIS & DAVIES, supra note 43, at 27. 
 50 Vora & Vora, supra note 45, at 303–04, 320. See also Mark N. Katz, Syria: Prospects for Transition 
from Minority to Majority Rule, E-INT’L REL. (June 16, 2012), http://e-ir.info/2012/06/16/syria-prospects-for-
transition-from-minority-to-majority-rule/.  
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Alawis,51 while the Saudis support Sunni Salafists,52 and the Turks and Qataris 
support the Muslim Brotherhood.53 Without Russian and U.S. involvement, 
there is fear that a removal of Assad will result in a power vacuum and all the 
tragedy, which will most likely follow, brought about by the situation created 
by a failed state.54 
In any event, what seemed essential to what South Africa achieved was a 
trade that was made during the peace process between seeking justice against 
those who had orchestrated apartheid and doing what was necessary to make 
peace work for a transition to an integrated society. As Desmond Tutu 
famously once said, what South Africa needed was “the truth, more than 
justice.”55 His intent was evidenced in his leadership in the writing of the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Preamble.56 Importantly, the South 
African TRC was expressly provided for in the enactment of the new South 
African Constitution.57 As a result, the TRC avoided the legal trap that 
otherwise exists when TRCs are created independent of the nation’s founding 
documents: that any later prosecutions arising from the TRCs processes are 
extra-legal because the TRC has no jurisdiction. 
The question will be whether the Assad regime will ever agree to a 
transitional period that uses a TRC. On the one hand, it is hard for any rational 
 
 51 Nathan Gonzalez, Solving the Sunni-Shia Conflict Begins with Tehran, DIPLOMAT (May 23, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/solving-the-sunni-shia-conflict-begins-with-tehran/.  
 52 Ed Husain, ISIS Atrocities Started With Saudi Support for Salafi Hate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/isis-atrocities-started-with-saudi-support-for-salafi-hate.html?_r=
0 (“Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram, the Shabab and others are all violent Sunni 
Salafi groupings. For five decades, Saudi Arabia has been the official sponsor of Sunni Salafism across the 
globe.”). 
 53 Ryan Mauro, Call in Congress to Sanction Turkey, Qatar for Terror Support, CLARION PROJECT (Dec. 
11, 2014), http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/members-congress-sanction-turkey-qatar-terror-support. See 
also Qatar Emir Support for Muslim Brotherhood is a “Duty,” MIDDLE E. MONITOR (Dec. 13, 2013, 3:54 
PM), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/9000-qatar-emir-support-for-muslim-brotherhood
-is-a-qdutyq.  
 54 Chase Carter, The Case for Assad, NAT’L INT. (June 20, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-
case-assad-10708.  
 55 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Address to the South African Press Club (Oct. 21, 1997). See generally 
ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
(2000); Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa Amnesty: The Price of Peace, in 
RETRIBUTION AND REPATRIATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 299–316 (John Elster ed., Cambridge 
U. Press 2006). 
 56 See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.) (amended 1997). 
 57 For a textual analysis of the constitution, see generally HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH 
AFRICA, A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2010). 
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actor to admit that it is unwilling to face a Truth and Reconciliation process. 
After all, to refuse such a process implicates that the actors themselves realize 
that their explanations or confessions are not likely to be met with a 
sympathetic response. Their refusal might mean that they know their violent 
acts against civilians to fight terrorists will only take them so far when the 
consequences of their actions impacted so many innocent civilians and was 
applied so indiscriminately as to violate all notions of proportionality and just 
war theory. Either they should feel like they can explain their justifications for 
the use of force (they were ordered to take their actions by superiors who have 
since been granted amnesty, or were so overcome by fear and concern for 
themselves and their loved ones that they hated to do what they did, and now 
ask for forgiveness), or they will likely have to admit that their acts were raw 
exercises of power that disregarded the dignity of the Syrian population, and 
put their own needs ahead of the needs of innocent Syrians. 
The dilemma Tutu poses between “truth” and “justice” is one that TRCs 
have struggled with ever since South Africa. Some have sought justice 
following the TRC processes, claiming that individuals did not speak the truth, 
or that they did not do so with remorse, and so it was still the purview of the 
TRC to recommend subsequent prosecutions.58 Some even sought to use 
statements by expatriates, given in confidence, as the grounds for future 
prosecutions of individuals for war crimes.59 
2. Difficulties with TRCs in Liberia, Rwanda, and Kenya 
Yet, despite the apparent success of South Africa’s TRC, subsequent TRC 
processes in Liberia, Rwanda, and Kenya have floundered.60 The ability of 
prosecutors in these countries to be able to bring evidence against these 
defendants has been compromised by the passage of time, the difficulty of 
getting witnesses to step forward and testify, and failures of capacity in the 
courts.61 In other words the dilemma postulated by Desmond Tutu, that truth 
will be sacrificed for justice, seems to continue to be real because the ability to 
get justice has been compromised by the atrocities themselves. The dilemma 
 
 58 Rosalind Raddatz, Tempering Great Expectations: Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in Liberia, 
in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND PEACEBUILDING ON THE GROUND: VICTIMS AND EX-COMBATANTS 178, 186 
(Chandra Lekha Sriram et al. eds., 2013). 
 59 Id. at 181–88. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.  
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seems to be based in part on the belief that producing evidence of war crimes is 
a very difficult and time-consuming process that is likely to produce little in 
the way of what would constitute admissible evidence in a court of law.62 The 
tough trade between truth and justice thus seems required by the very nature of 
the atrocities: that those in power will be able to avoid accountability for what 
they did, either because there are so few survivors, or because those surviving 
will not be willing or able to come forward to give evidence for what was done 
to them. 
Still, the example of South Africa suggests that where the pressures for 
peace take precedent (such pressures could come from Russia and/or Iran—the 
question then becoming would Russia or Iran be willing to grant Assad 
asylum?), then those left behind may rather face a TRC process with the 
promise of amnesty, than the ICC or some existing Syrian court structure that 
will likely be run by opposition judges. Without such pressures, the Syrian 
regime will likely insist on some arrangement like that granted to the Egyptian 
Supreme Military Council, agreeing only to sit on the sidelines and have the 
right to become involved again should it feel threatened, or for the “good of the 
Syrians generally.” One option might be to require that the military leadership 
submit to some specially designed hybrid military tribunal if they are interested 
in seeking to continue in their leadership positions. That way each individual 
Syrian would have to decide for themselves whether their continued exercise 
of power would be able to withstand the scrutiny of a judicial process. 
If one assumes a working Supreme Constitutional Court or Supreme Court 
of general jurisdiction sufficiently independent of the executive branch, might 
such a body serve as the arbiter of past or ongoing acts against the state and its 
citizens?63 
The 1973 Constitution followed a coup by Assad’s father, who potentially 
controlled a drafting process leading to the guarantees of a Ba’ath (Alawite) 
controlled nomination process for Presidency64 and broad emergency powers65 
 
 62 Id. at 186. 
 63 Choosing this option has the potential of keeping the ICC at bay, under principles of complementarity. 
 64 According to the Constitution, the President of the Republic is elected for seven years according to the 
Christian calendar, beginning at the date of the expiration of the term of the incumbent President. 
CONSTITUTION OF SYRIA Mar. 13, 1973. See Phil Sands, Syria’s New Constitution Has Not Weakened Baath 
Party’s Grip on Power, NATIONAL (May 1, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/syrias-
new-constitution-has-not-weakened-baath-partys-grip-on-power#full.  
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provisions, which his son followed during a discussion for a new Constitution 
in 2012. 
Each Constitution presents significant challenges for the transition period. 
At a substantive level there is the debate between a parliamentary system 
described in the 1950 Constitution and the stronger presidential style 
governance structure described in the 1973 and 2012 Constitutions.66 The 
Constitution of 1950 was replaced, so unless agreed to by the parties, it is later 
subject to challenge by anyone who was not a party to the agreement.67 
The 2012 Constitution builds on the 1973 Constitution, which provides for 
the president to exercise emergency powers, disband the legislature, and 
overrule the judiciary should the president determine that it is necessary for the 
security of Syria.68 On the other hand, the 2012 Constitution with amendments 
might be more palatable to Assad and therefore is something he might agree to 
during a transition period until the end of a third term (he was elected in 2000, 
2007, and again in 2014). The 2012 Constitution could be amended to allow a 
president to only serve three terms, and provide that the term runs from 2014 to 
2021, or for another six years. This would allow Assad to be President for the 
transition period. Other amendments might include forbidding the president 
from declaring emergency powers, submission to the decisions of the 
legislature, and the ruling of an independent Supreme Court. If the president 
would be granted immunity during the transitional period, and his power 
checked by a time limit that he would stay in power, and agree to share power 
in the executive structure, Assad might find this an acceptable face-saving 
trade-off for peace. The question would be whether Assad would also agree 
that others in his regime would have to subject themselves to the workings of 
the Constitutional Courts. Would (or could) Assad open the possibility that 
security and/or military leaders would have to answer to war crimes committed 
against civilians? He might trade his continuation in power for the jurisdiction 
of the court over these other decision makers. If it is true that he did not know 
that his military leaders were committing war crimes, he might be willing to 
 
 65 CARSTEN WIELAND, SYRIA: A DECADE OF LOST CHANCES: REPRESSION AND REVOLUTION FROM 
DAMASCUS SPRING TO ARAB SPRING 208–09 (2012). Wieland surmises that Assad’s failure to accept 
democratic reforms and his use of emergency powers is best explained by his feeling of isolation due to 
accusations of his role in the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Harari in February of 2012. Id. 
 66 See SYRIAN CTR. FOR POLITICAL & STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE SYRIAN EXPERT HOUSE, SYRIA 
TRANSITION ROADMAP 57, 60 (2013). 
 67 See id. at 61. 
 68 WIELAND, supra note 65, at 208–09. 
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make the trade.69 If he did know, he is likely to refuse such a trade-off because 
some will most likely offer evidence against Assad to explain why they did 
what they did. Assuming some agreement to put independent members of the 
Syrian community on that court, there is at least a theoretical possibility that 
such a court could proceed against these actors and bring them to justice.70 
Still, use of the existing legal frameworks presents significant challenges. 
Who will sit on such courts? Will these courts have the capacity to try these 
individuals for past crimes? In answer to the latter question, new developments 
in modern evidence gathering techniques suggest that with some minor support 
from the international community, the capacity of the Syrians to try individuals 
subjected to the jurisdiction of Syrian courts is not only possible, but likely to 
produce both due process for the accused and the evidence necessary to 
convict those who committed such atrocities.71 There are significant risks to 
the continued peace during the transitional peace process if these national 
and/or regional courts refused to prosecute either Assad or his regime 
leadership, or prosecute but in the end find no evidence of wrongdoing. 
E. Interim Governing Constitution Providing for Both a Formal Structure for 
Dealing with Interpretations of the Interim Constitution, and Informal 
Mediation Processes Backed by a Hybrid Criminal Process—The Best 
Option Where the U.N. is Involved 
An interim period that removed the executive power from the president and 
put it into the hands of a “Supreme Legislative Council” might comply with 
the terms of the Geneva II communiqué,72 and provide a period in which Syria 
 
 69 60 Minutes: Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (CBS television broadcast Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/syria-president-bashar-al-assad-60-minutes-charlie-rose/. Assad repeats a twisted logic that 
he can’t be committing war crimes (use of chemical weapons including most recently chlorine gas and barrel 
bombs) against Syrians because they continue to support him. How he knows they continue to support him is 
met with his assertions that they do.  
 70 Eugenio Bulygin, Criminal Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations, YALE L. SCH. SEMINARIO EN 
LATINOAMÉRICA DE TEORÎA CONSTITUCIONAL Y POLÍTICA (2001), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
Bulygin_Criminal_Prosecutions_of_Human_Rights_Violations.pdf (discussing the transitions from 
dictatorship to democracy in Argentina, Chile, and Greece; Argentinian prosecution of military juntas for past 
atrocities in the 1970s and 80s suggests that a country’s internal judicial procedures, even if ad hoc, can often 
be adequate to the task). 
 71 See Alex Schank, Sectarianism and Transitional Justice in Syria: Resisting International Trials, 45 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 557, 571 (2014). 
 72 See Final Communique, ACTION GROUP FOR SYRIA (June 30, 2012), http://www.un.org/News/dh/
infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.  
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could transition into a new Constitutional governance structure, selected by the 
Syrian people, like that done in 1950. A constituent assembly of some sort 
could be organized and divisive issues such as whether the government will be 
based on a parliamentary system or provide for an independently elected 
president can be postponed until it has had a chance to deliberate on the issues 
and reach a consensus. South Africa, again, sets a good example of this option. 
In 1994 the opposition party, led by Mandela and the government, represented 
by de Klerk, agreed on thirty-two fundamental principles that would apply 
during the transition and, importantly, to the new constitution that would 
follow free elections.73 In South Africa’s case, these provisions were brought 
into force by “interim” amendments to the existing constitution.74 These 
arrangements included the requirement of a new Constitutional Court that 
would examine any reformulated constitution for compliance with these 
principles.75 The new Constitutional Court would then be bound by the thirty-
two fundamental principles as constituting a higher law in order to ensure that 
a democratic, non-racial secular government could not be usurped through a 
majoritarian legislative enactment.76 
An Interim Governing Constitution is “imposed” unilaterally by the parties 
to the peace agreement.77 Its legal authority might come in the form of an 
“amendment” to the existing Constitution to provide for the interim 
Constitution.78 Accompanying the Interim Constitution should be agreements 
for the additional safeguarding of human rights and fundamental freedoms, an 
independent “judiciary” body, and a neutral political environment in which the 
national dialogue would take place.79 Provisions for a democratic electoral 
process might be part of this stage of the process with support for multiparty 
 
 73 MARAIS & DAVIES, supra note 43, at 8–9.  
 74 Mac Maharaj, The ANC and South Africa’s Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace, in 
RESISTANCE/LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND TRANSITIONS TO POLITICS 26–29 (Veronique Dudouet & David 
Bloomfield eds., 2008). 
 75 Brice Dickson, Protecting Human Rights Through a Constitutional Court: The Case of South Africa, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 539–40 (1997). 
 76 LAURA SEGAL & SHARON CORT, ONE LAW, ONE NATION: THE MAKING OF THE SOUTH AFRICA 
CONSTITUTION 119–33 (2011). 
 77 See generally THE CARTER CENTER, SYRIA: OPTIONS FOR A POLITICAL TRANSITION (2014), 
http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/Options-for-Political-
Transition-in-Syria-Aug-2014-en.pdf.  
 78 Id. at 12, 14. 
 79 Id. at 25. 
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elections.80 The agreement should also set out a timeframe for the transitional 
period, with benchmarks.81 
Following its post-election violence in 2007, Kenya enacted a similar 
arrangement. The parties agreed to a “power-sharing” agreement, with an 
expansion of powers to the Prime Minister, along with increased numbers of 
cabinet posts, but instead of establishing its own Constitutional Court in the 
interim, referred matters of post-election violence to the ICC.82 
Vital to the success of these interim arrangements are the establishment of 
oversight mechanisms and a separation of powers structure in order to protect 
against a strong leader returning to power. It also protects against a minority 
sect that once is in power would seek to override the majority/minority rights 
of other sects or religious groups.83 At a minimum, some provision in the 
agreement should rule out the use of “emergency” powers by the Executive (or 
Supreme Military Council) during the interim period. Zimbabwe is an example 
of a cautionary tale in this regard. Following its crisis in 2008, it adopted an 
interim agreement on the model of Kenya but without a sufficient mechanism 
for oversight during the interim period.84 The President had reluctantly signed 
the agreement, and thereafter he did not abide by its terms and principles.85 To 
provide against this possibility, interim arrangements might include the 
establishment of a Transitional National Assembly and a Transitional Judicial 
Council, together providing the checks and balances over the Transitional 
Governing Body. 
 
 80 Id. at 15. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Text of Power-Sharing Agreement in Kenya, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.retuers.com/article/
2008/02/28/us-kenya-crisis-text-idUSL2822580120080228. Similar arrangements were used in Papua New 
Guinea in the Bougainville Peace Process. See Bougainville Peace Process art. 1, Apr. 9, 2002, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/bougain_20010830.pdf. 
Similar arrangements were also used in Yemen in 2012, but the Yemen interim period has not proved 
successful, as the tribal differences have grown violent, leading to resignation of the President of the interim 
government. Leela Jacinto, How a ‘peace deal’ Plunged Yemen Deeper into Chaos, FR. 24 (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20150122-yemen-houthi-peace-deal-president-resigns-shiite/.  
 83 For example, during the South Africa transitional period, de Klerk agreed to a structure that bound the 
military to the President and created a Constitutional Court that would provide the independent interpretation 
of the South Africa Constitution, including its enforcement of minority rights. Dickson, supra note 75, at 532. 
 84 Alexander Noyes, Securing Reform? Power Sharing and Civil-Security Relations in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, 13 AFR. STUD. Q., Winter 2013, at 39.  
 85 Id. at 34.  
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How these oversight bodies might be constituted is worth a close look. For 
example, one option for Syria is to use transitional oversight bodies like those 
used in Cambodia86 and provided for in the Dayton Peace Accords.87 Of 
course, these transitional bodies were imposed by the international community 
after there had been a forced regime change.88 Still, the various regional 
powers might demand a new power-sharing arrangement to end the conflict, 
and Syrians themselves could turn to the international community for help. 
Each peace agreement (Cambodia and Dayton) included representation from 
the international community, from the U.N. Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, in the case of Cambodia, or a “high representative” from 
the international community, in the case of Dayton.89 These served as 
“guarantors” of the peace agreement.90 A further recent example of the role 
that the U.N. can play in investigating and providing proof for war crimes 
comes in its investigation into Assad and Hezbollah. The U.N. tried five 
Hezbollah members, in absentia, for their killing of former Prime Minister 
Rafik Hariri of Lebanon and twenty-one others.91 
 
 86 See Cambodia, INT’L CT. FOR TRANSITIONAL J., https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/
cambodia (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).  
 87 See Peace Implementation Conference for the Bosnian General Framework Agreement: Conclusions 
of the London Meeting, 35 I.L.M. 223 (1996); Elizabeth M. Bruch, Hybrid Courts: Examining Hybridity 
Through a Post-Colonial Lens, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 10 (2010). 
The Human Rights Chamber was created under Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement to 
“assist the Parties in honouring their obligations” to secure the highest level of international 
human rights protection for the people of Bosnia. More broadly, it was conceived as an 
intentionally hybrid court with the teleology of achieving Europeanized protection of human 
rights and the rule of law in the specific context of post-war Bosnia. 
Id. 
 88 Id. at 8; see also David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: 
“Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2007) (evaluating hybrid tribunals 
in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia). 
 89 Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, sec. 2, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/608 (Oct. 30, 1991); 
Dayton Peace Agreement, Geneva Annex, Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina art. 8, 
§ 3(d), Nov. 30, 1995, UN Doc. A/50/79C.  
 90 Id.  
 91 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the Establishment of a Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N.-Leb., Jan. 29, 2007, 2461 U.N.T.S. 280, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007); 
Ronan Bergman, The Hezbollah Connection, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/15/magazine/the-hezbollah-connection.html?_r=0. A human rights organization called Witness works 
to train journalists to gather evidence that could later be used in criminal prosecutions in areas like Rio, and in 
other conflicts around the world. The article also described the work by two engineers from the Medical 
College of Wisconsin, Brian Laning and Bonnie Freudinger, who recently won a USAID grant to work on the 
International Evidence Locker, a free smartphone app. Photos collected on the app are automatically location, 
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Of course, President Assad may have significant objections to giving up 
this kind of power during the interim period. Still, the principles for 
governance during the interim period might provide sufficient guarantees for 
the safety and security of the President himself. In addition, the agreement 
should make clear that the oversight body and membership would be neutral 
yet principled, ensuring that no side uses force or violence to bring about its 
goals. In other words, the principal purpose of the oversight committee would 
be to provide a forum for the mediation of disputes between the parties by (1) 
insisting on the non-violent and peaceful resolution of disputes, occurring out 
of the public glare, and (2) moving the parties along to the end of the transition 
period when democratic processes and a new constitution can take over. In 
addition, one option that might be used during the interim is a TRC-like 
process that is designed for the resolution of disputes involving the leadership 
of the military and security forces. This might provide enough “truth” about 
what was done by the military during the civil war to help the country move 
past the war and start to take constructive actions toward a peaceful future. 
Whatever the dispute resolution system chosen by the Syrians for disputes 
between the Syrian leadership and military leadership, there yet remains to be 
determined what dispute resolution systems during the interim period should 
be employed at the local levels. What will be the processes that will deal with 
Syrians who engaged on behalf of opposition groups, or DASH, or ISIS, and 
remain in Syria? In addition, the interim period will need to provide a system 
for handling disputes that will arise between those who stayed and those who 
left during the civil war, and to hold accountable any who engage in violence 
during the interim period. 
Syrians who committed atrocities on behalf of opposition groups or who 
engaged in murder, extortion, and kidnapping for criminal gain may remain in 
these communities post-conflict. The capacity of Syrian courts to handle these 
disputes will likely need to wait until after a new constitution has been enacted 
and judges can be appointed. In the meantime Syria may choose to empower 
and support its local assemblies, Shari’a courts, councils, and governing bodies 
in handling disputes that occur in those communities. Civil service 
organizations should ready an effort to train and support these local bodies in 
 
date, and time-stamped, encrypted and securely sent to two separate protected servers. They can also be 
submitted anonymously. Matthew Shaer, The Media Doesn’t Care What Happens Here: Can Amateur 
Journalism Bring Justice to Rio’s Favelas?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
02/22/magazine/the-media-doesnt-care-what-happens-here.html.  
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mediated solutions, if possible, to the acts committed during the war. One 
option is to use Rwanda-style Abunzi proceedings that use community 
standards for determining the facts, use sanctions that emphasize compensation 
over retribution, use community rituals that may produce meaningful truth 
telling, and open the possibility of victim forgiveness.92 
Syria might adopt a dispute resolution process similar to that used in Iraq in 
the aftermath of the war removing Saddam Hussein to deal with real property 
disputes that arose between those who stayed and those who left during the 
war.93 A United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-
backed U.N. Commission called the Committee for the Resolution of Real 
Property Disputes (CRRPD) was set up to mediate such disputes.94 The 
Commission trained Iraqis to mediate these disputes with a goal of keeping the 
parties from resorting to violence.95 The program has since been integrated into 
Iraqi governance structures as the Iraqi Real Property Commission.96 It gives 
the right to compensation from the Iraqi government to anyone displaced by a 
returning Iraqi.97 By all reports it has resolved most of the real property 
disputes without the parties ever resorting to violence.98 
Finally, the interim period might also provide for a back-up dispute 
resolution system, should the informal processes not provide adequate 
resolution of disputes on a local level. A hybrid body might be employed for 
cases that need the oversight of an appellate review process. This second 
“backup” judicial body could operate like the old circuit courts, where it 
travels from place to place to place to hold proceedings on the most egregious 
cases. The body could be made up of Syrian judges, supported by international 
prosecutors and defense counsel, ready to step in should the dispute not be 
 
 92 See Abunzi, REPUBLIC RWANDA MINISTRY JUST., http://www.minijust.gov.rw/services/abunzi (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
 93 Statute of the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes No. 2 of 2006 (Iraq), 
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Iraq/files/Iraq_PC_Statute_Com
mission_Property_Resolution_2006_EN.pdf.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Peter Van der Auweraert, Senior Legal Officer, Reparations Programmes Unit, Int’l Org. for 
Migration, Presentation at U.S. Dep’t of State Symposium on Post Conflict Restitution: Property Restitution in 
Iraq (Sept. 6-7, 2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/98032.pdf.  
 96 Statute of the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes, supra note 93. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Peter Van der Auweraert, Iraq Updates its Approach to Former Regime-Related Land and Property 
Claims, TERRE NULLIUS (Mar. 11, 2010), https://terra0nullius.wordpress.com/2010/03/11/iraq-updates-its-
approach-to-former-regime-related-land-and-property-claims/.  
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resolved to the satisfaction of the parties, to investigate the dispute using 
international standards of evidence gathering, and to ensure due process was 
provided to the accused. 
In the end, this two-tiered system of dispute resolution best balances the 
need for peace against Syrian insistence on fighting impunity for those who 
committed crimes against civilians. Especially when backed by the ability of 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide support to 
both formal and informal dispute resolution processes, the transitional 
government can both continue to enforce the end of violent conflict and 
manage a dispute resolution process out of the public eye until the new 
governance structure is enacted. 
II. CONFLICT MAPPING OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS IMPACT ON DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD 
Since the start of the Syrian conflict, both victims and perpetrators of war 
crimes have been prolific in their use of video postings on YouTube, 
Facebook, MySpace and Twitter.99 In addition, Syrians have sent a large 
number of videos as attachments in emails to friends and acquaintances.100 
These videos depict not only atrocities committed against Syrians by the 
government, but also promote various armed group activities and recruitment 
of new members.101 As we have seen in Part I, the evidence provided through 
public source social media has changed the equation between truth and justice 
that may exit in any transition period following the Syrian civil war.102 In 
particular, video evidence collected by NGOs like Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 
and other NGOs with conflict mapping projects raises important implications 
for the transition options discussed above.103 Proof might already exist that the 
 
 99 See generally MARC LYNCH, DEEN FREELON & SEAN ADAY, U.S. INST. PEACE, BLOGS AND BULLETS 
III: SYRIA’S SOCIALLY MEDIATED CIVIL WAR 7 (2014), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW91-Syrias%
20Socially%20Mediated%20Civil%20War.pdf. Cf. Lauren Kirkwood, Study Finds Bias in Internet Postings 
About Syria’s Civil War, MCCLATCHY DC (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/
world/middle-east/article24764167.html.  
 100 LYNCH, FREELON & ADAY, supra note 99, at 14. 
 101 Id. at 6. 
 102 See supra Part I.  
 103 See Syria: Strong Evidence Government Used Chemicals as a Weapon: Civilian Casualties in Barrel 
Bomb Attacks on 3 Towns, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/13/syria-
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Assad government used chemical weapons and barrel bombs, and killed 
civilians indiscriminately during the war. Similarly, what was done by ISIS, or 
by various opposition groups, might also be sufficiently documented to prove 
that members of these groups committed war crimes. As a result of this social 
media evidence, the truth of what has been done and by whom is known even 
before a peace agreement is reached. 
Why a particular bombing, beheading, use of chemical weapons, or other 
indiscriminate killing was committed may be in doubt, but these matters are 
subject to more discrete items of proof. If the person involved was ordered to 
commit a criminal act, there should be evidence of such an order. If President 
Assad denies knowing about what was done, he may face a burden in court of 
presenting evidence of what he did to remove those who committed such acts 
from their leadership positions, or why he did not investigate what was done 
and by whom.104 At a minimum such failure may subject the leader to criminal 
responsibility.105 In any event, a decision to give amnesty to suspected war 
criminals in Syria in advance of these individuals agreeing to end the violence 
and stop fighting should not require the same blind trade between truth and 
justice that may have been required to end past conflicts. 
The conflict mapping projects, in some respects, intensify the difficulties 
for the peacemakers in brokering a peace with known war criminals. Now the 
calculation is the hard pragmatic choice between continued fighting and loss of 
future lives. To the extent that such a choice has implications for the victims of 
these atrocities, it is likely not within the authority of the peacemakers to make 
these difficult assessments or trade-offs by themselves. For lasting peace some 
provision needs to be made to hold those who did these acts accountable. As I 
have argued elsewhere, in order for amnesty and forgiveness to be granted in 
the peace agreement, the victims must know what they are forgiving, and then 
 
strong-evidence-government-used-chemicals-weapon; ORGANISATION FOR PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS, 
http://www.opcw.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2015). 
 104 Kai Ambos, General Principles of International Criminal Law, 21: Superior Responsibility, in THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 823, 832 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002); 
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 24 (2009). The ICC uses the doctrine of 
command or superior responsibility to provide it with proof of intent necessary to convict an individual for war 
crimes. If a leader argues he did not know war crimes had been committed, then once having learned, what 
steps did the leader take to remove the individual from power.  
 105 Ambos, supra note 104, at 833. 
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be the ones to grant the forgiveness.106 Without their input, the agreement may 
only delay questions of retribution, reconciliation or forgiveness.107 
One option for peacemakers is to put the choice to the individuals seeking 
amnesty of whether they will submit their actions to an impartial tribunal, or 
whether they will instead leave the jurisdiction of the Syrian courts and the 
ICC as a condition of peace. Otherwise, the leadership of the parties might be 
given the option of submitting to the processes of a TRC or the local tribunal 
(like the Abunzi-like tribunals used in Rwanda),108 to work out reconciliation 
between those who committed the atrocities and their victims and the victim’s 
families. 
In setting up these various options for dispute resolution during the 
transitional period, the U.N. or an international NGO (like HRW and/or other 
human rights organizations that are not intimately involved in the peace 
process)109 may now provide a unique supporting role in the work of both the 
formal court proceedings and the informal TRC’s or local mediation efforts. 
They can help provide the supporting evidence for these alternative forums to 
help make the determination necessary and appropriate to each alternative: to 
make findings of fact of what happened during any alleged war crime, and help 
the parties assess the nature of the act committed, in order for the victims to 
make meaningful determinations of whether forgiveness is in the offing. 
First, we will look at how admissible proof that can connect war criminals 
with their murders and with the victims of their crimes may change the peace-
making equation in dealing with the perpetrators of atrocities in Syria. We will 
look at admissibility standards in the U.S., the ICC, and in criminal 
prosecutions under present Syrian law to see what challenges will likely come 
from the use of social media evidence. Next, we will look at how such 
evidence might also be used in TRC or local community mediation settings 
 
 106 Paul J. Zwier, History, Creative Imagination, and Forgiveness in Mediation on an International Stage: 
Practical Lessons from Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 194, 195 (2015). 
 107 Kristin C. Doughty, Contesting Community: Legalized Reconciliation Efforts in the Aftermath of 
Genocide in Rwanda 337–38 (May 16, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on 
file with the Penn Libraries, University of Pennsylvania). 
 108 See Abunzi, supra note 92.  
 109 Note that some NGOs like The Carter Center refuse to use their conflict mapping for other than 
humanitarian purposes, in that it could potentially compromise its neutrality in negotiations for peace, if it 
were seen to be gathering evidence against the parties.  
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that might create a greater likelihood that meaningful reconciliation will take 
place. 
A. Use of Social Media Videos and Proof in Formal Judicial Proceedings 
Consider evidence recently collected by HRW concerning the Syrian 
government’s use of barrel bombs.110 This evidence strongly suggests that 
Syrian government helicopters dropped barrel bombs embedded with cylinders 
of chlorine gas on three towns in Northern Syria in mid-April 2014.111 The 
question is whether such evidence would be admissible, if provided to a 
judicial body like the ICC or a western style court. Allegations that the Syrian 
military used an industrial chemical as a weapon, an act banned by the 
international treaty prohibiting chemical weapons,112 would be important in 
proving a case against Assad, or his military leaders, of committing war 
crimes. Syria signed on to the international treaty in October 2013,113 so it 
would be difficult to deny that it knew such acts were criminal. What would 
 
 110 See Syria: Strong Evidence Government Used Chemicals as a Weapon, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13, 
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/13/syria-strong-evidence-government-used-chemicals-weapon. Improvised 
barrel bombs “are typically constructed from large oil drums, various types of metal cylinders, and water tanks 
filled with explosives and scrap metal to enhance fragmentation, which are then dropped from a helicopter. 
The heat from the explosion of the barrel bomb would destroy much of the chlorine and any remaining gas 
would be dispersed in the air by the explosion so the concentration of chlorine would quickly drop to non-
lethal levels.” Id.  
 111 Id. Much of the evidence gathered concerning the use of chemical weapons was through interviews of 
OPCW and HRW soon after the attacks. HRW’s deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa went into 
Syria and interviewed a number of witnesses, concluding that Syria had used chlorine gas as a weapon and had 
targeted civilians. It recommended that the U.N. Security Council refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. The 
pictures and video evidence can help expose the true nature of Assad’s denial that barrel bombs were used. Id. 
But see Syria Conflict: BBC Exclusive Interview with President Bashar al-Assad, BBC (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:57 
AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327153. In this interview, President Assad denied that 
Syria was using barrel bombs or chlorine gas in their war against the opposition. During the BBC interview, 
Assad seems to be denying that the Syrian government was engaged in the use of barrel bombs, or chlorine 
gas, or at least that he doesn’t know that they are using barrel bombs or chlorine gas. Though his argument is a 
little suspect—that he has no reason to use these types of weapons against Syrian civilians, so therefore he 
isn’t using them. Assad does not say that he has investigated their use, and claims he directed the army not to 
use these types of weapons. Presumably he could have offered his willingness to investigate, as that is the 
process he went through in helping the U.N. dispose of other chemical weapons. He does not offer a 
willingness to investigate whether his military is engaged in the use of barrel bombs or chlorine gas.  
 112 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Sept. 3, 1992, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force 
Apr. 29, 1997). 
 113 Syria Officially Joins the UN Chemical Weapons Convention, HINDU (Oct. 14, 2013, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/syria-officially-joins-un-chemical-weapons-convention/
article5233423.ece.  
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remain for a prosecutor would be to prove whether a particular military leader, 
or President Assad, knew the chlorine gas was being used, or knew that barrel 
bombs were being dropped on civilians. 
The HRW and OPCW proof is just a small part of the evidence the NGO 
community has gathered during the Syrian conflict. For example, an 
organization at Stanford University has taken up the task of mapping militant 
organizations, including ISIS.114 Using special mapping techniques over time it 
has been able to show the growth of various militant groups and map their 
activities.115 
In addition, consider what might be accomplished through a Conflict 
Mapping Project run by the U.N. to support later prosecutions regarding the 
treatment of women and children,116 and of the parties for war crimes, or assist 
in any process that would attempt to bring reconciliation between the parties 
and victims. If the U.N. is able to adequately segregate its mapping projects 
from it peacemaking efforts, it might be able to support post-conflict transition 
periods, depending on what type of transition is negotiated. Where the peace 
agreement asks for involvement of the ICC, it can use the information it gained 
as evidence, and where the peace agreement will use a TRC or other informal 
reconciliation process, it can use the data to support more meaningful 
confessions and possibilities for forgiveness. 
Most of the data used in conflict mapping comes from public-source social 
media.117 There are some reports that over 700,000 videos have been posted by 
Syrians on YouTube since the conflict began in 2011.118 By coding and 
searching these videos, a map of the conflict can produce significant results. 
 
 114 Mapping Militant Organizations, STAN. U., http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
 115 See id. 
 116 See generally MADRE ET AL., SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMANDING CHANGE: A REPORT ON 
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA BEFORE AND DURING THE CONFLICT (2014), http://www.law. 
cuny.edu/academics/clinics/iwhr/publications/Seeking-Accountability-and-Demanding-Change-A-Report-on-
Womens-Human-Rights-Violations-in-Syria-Before-and-During-the-Conflict.pdf.  
 117 Federico Guerrini, How Researchers Use Social Media to Map the Conflict in Syria, FORBES (Apr. 15, 
2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/2014/04/15/how-researchers-use-social-
media-to-map-armed-forces-in-syria/print/.  
 118 Palanir Technologies provides technologies to map data over time in a variety of settings. See Mapping 
the Syrian Crisis with the Carter Center, PALANTIR: PALANTIR BLOG (June 5, 2014), https://www.palantir.
com/2014/06/mapping-the-syrian-crisis-with-the-carter-center/.  
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Such a project would be able to coordinate videos with other reports of 
events at certain places and locations in Syria and map those reports with the 
information it is coding from the videos. Take, for example, a news report on 
Al Jazeera News, that ISIS had beheaded a Shia Muslim, simply for being a 
Shia.119 ISIS seemed bent on provoking Shias in Syria into an all-out civil 
war.120 A mapping of the conflict would allow the mapper to identify the place 
Al Jazeera reported as where the beheading took place as one in which ISIS 
was involved. It could confirm that another related insurgent group had posted 
a video of a clash where the Shia was said to have been beheaded.121 It could 
then confirm that the video of the place where the clash occurred is consistent 
with the video of the beheaded body of a young Arab. The clash between the 
related ISIS group is easily identified by referring to that group’s promotional 
video as being against a predominately Shia insurgent group. It seemed to 
corroborate that ISIS is taking responsibility for a real event—a war crime. An 
event that not only violates humanitarian law, but also, at least for some 
Muslims, is a misinterpretation of the meaning of “jihad” and violates seventy-
five Islamic verses from the Koran, attributed to the Prophet himself, which 
forbid such acts against minority groups.122 
In 2011, a number of research organizations123 noticed that there were an 
enormous number of YouTube videos that were being posted by various 
groups that seemed to be documenting acts of violence in Syria and started 
gathering social media postings on the conflict. At first, most were taken from 
hand-held devices like cell phones; the videos were poor quality and the 
camera moved and jerked throughout the video.124 The sound quality was also 
 
 119 See Twitter Users Call for #ISISMediaBlackout Following Purported Beheading of US Journalist, AL 
JAZEERA (Aug. 20, 2014), http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201408201239-0024088 [hereinafter Twitter 
Users Call for #ISISMediaBlackout]. 
 120 Ahmed Rashid, ISIS: What the US Doesn’t Understand, NYR DAILY (Dec. 2, 2014, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/dec/02/isis-what-us-doesnt-understand/.  
 121 Twitter Users Call for #ISISMediaBlackout, supra note 119. 
 122 But see Robert Spencer, Muslim Cleric Justifies Islamic State Beheadings, JIHAD WATCH (Aug. 25, 
2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.jihadwatch.org/2014/08/muslim-cleric-justifies-islamic-state-beheadings-islam-is-
a-religion-of-beheading (noting the Prophet spoke directly against the killing of minority religious groups in 
negotiating the rights of passage of Muslims to pilgrimage to Mecca).  
 123 See, e.g., POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY NOW, http://www.polgeonow.com (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
 124 John Hall, ISIS Mass Beheading Video Took up to Six HOURS to Film and Cost $200,000: Forensic 
Analysis of Syrian Soldier Murders Reveals Clues that Could Help Nail Jihadi John, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 8, 
2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2865745/Has-EXACT-location-infamous-ISIS-
beheading-video-pinpointed-Forensic-analysis-filmed-Syrian-soldier-murders-breaks-filmed-long-took-cost-
make.html#ixzz3YKpGgHDR.  
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quite bad. Later in the conflict, there were more professionally shot videos 
filled with high quality sound and special effects.125 In fact, there were 
approximately 600 videos posted per day between 2013 and 2014 trying to 
show the world what was happening in Syria.126 Concerned that many of the 
videos were from civilians trying to get the world to know what was 
happening, some NGOs hired staff of young Arab-speaking researchers to code 
the videos according to a number of criteria, including type of group; its 
mission, place, time and date; weapons shown; and various information about 
victims.127 They also did the same with “formation” videos posted by different 
rebel groups, which were trying to recruit disaffected Arabs, and so were 
claiming responsibility for events that they may or may not have actually 
participated in.128 
The problem conflict mappers recognized early on was how it might use 
these videos to help map the conflict, and thereby provide information to the 
world, and to humanitarian groups about what was going on in Syria. How 
would mappers go about verifying and authenticating the information in these 
videos in order to help humanitarian groups determine who should receive 
funding and help, and who was likely a terrorist group? Of course, one way is 
to use a mindset of a prosecutor and set out to code the videos according to 
time and place whether they showed a clash (violence), force on force, 
chemical weapons, shelling, improvised explosive devices, bombings, aircraft 
or instances of crime, and killings. An investigator could also code the videos 
according to whether the videos were of civilians, or of military, the uniforms 
worn (deserters from the Syrian army?), the weapons they carried, their 
politics, the symbols they used to identify their group, and the narration that 
accompanied the video regarding why the group had formed. The higher 
number of code factors, the more one can use mapping techniques to explore 
 
 125 Id. The Carter Center’s conflict mapping project mapped some videos that were documented to have 
been shot and posted around the time that Saudi television was interviewing members of the insurgent group. 
Their appearance looks like the television studio not only did the news interview, it also then shot a 
promotional video for the group. These promotional videos apparently used the same kinds of special effects in 
their new casts, as was used in the video. 
 126 Jennifer Elias, Inside the Data Science That's Shining New Light on Syria's Civil War, CO.LABS (July 
28, 2014), http://www.fastcolabs.com/3033609/inside-the-data-science-thats-shining-new-light-on-syrias-civil-
war.  
 127 See PUB. INT’L LAW & POL’Y GRP., MAPPING ACCOUNTABILITY EFFORTS IN SYRIA 4–5 (2013), 
http://www.dchrs.org/english/File/Reports/mapping-accountability-efforts-in-syria.pdf.  
 128 See Elias, supra note 126. See also CARTER CTR., SYRIA COUNTRYWIDE CONFLICT REPORT #3, at 11–
18 (2014), http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/Nationwide
Update_march-14-2014.pdf [hereinafter CONFLICT REPORT #3]. 
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various relationships between these factors. One mapper has already recorded 
the existence of close to 6,000 different groups that have formed since the start 
of the civil war.129 A conflict mapper could then map the rise and fall, and/or 
consolidation of many of these groups until the present.130 
Other conflict mappers could then search news stories and data gathered by 
activist human rights organizations, as well as Facebook postings and Twitter 
accounts to attempt to corroborate and authenticate what they see on the 
videos. They could also map the conflict by coordinating what they see on 
video with the movement of refugees. These groups might also enlist the help 
of a computer software maker, like Palantir, Inc., to help it see the relationships 
between events, times, and places in the videos of a particular group or groups 
it is tracking. Palantir’s involvement has been crucial in helping The Carter 
Center see various relationships between the groups and data that was being 
produced for their ability to give advice for humanitarian purposes.131 
 




 129 CARTER CTR., SYRIA COUNTRYWIDE CONFLICT REPORT #4, at 11 (2014), http://www.cartercenter.org/ 
resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/NationwideUpdate-Sept-18-2014.pdf [hereinafter CONFLICT 
REPORT #4]. 
 130 Id. For example, The Carter Center can still identify close to 1,000 groups that are active in the 
conflict, roughly grouped according to five different major groups. See id. 
 131 See, e.g., Mapping Militant Organizations, supra note 114. See also CONFLICT REPORT #4, supra note 
129, at 3.  
 132 CONFLICT REPORT #3, supra note 128, at 9. 
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Freeze Frame from ISIS Facebook Video.
133 
Much of what has been collected would be admissible in court. To be 
admitted into evidence, such materials must be properly authenticated in a 
courtroom proceeding by the fundamentals of due process.134 The mapping 
project has included the gathering of sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that the particular videos are authentic.135 
A conflict mapper can potentially help authenticate the videos by providing 
evidence to identify and locate the witness who took the video, so long as that 
 
 133 CONFLICT REPORT #3, supra note 128, at 12. 
 134 See e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (requires laying a foundation of “evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims”). FED. R. EVID. 901(b) (provides an illustrative list of 
methods by which evidence can be authenticated). 
 135 See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of 
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the 
proponent claims it to be.”). Videos could be authenticated as a process or system. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) 
(“Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the 
process or system produces an accurate result.”). See also FED. R. EVID. 1001(a)–(b); FED. R. EVID. 1001(c) 
(provisions for using writings, recordings, and photographs); FED. R. EVID. 1001(d) (noting that an “original” 
of a writing or recording is “the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect 
by a person who executed or issued it”; an “original” of a photograph includes the negative or any print 
therefrom; if data is stored in a computer or similar device, “any printout—or other output readable by sight,” 
that is shown to reflect the data accurately, is an “original.”); FED. R. EVID. 1001(e) (“A duplicate means a 
counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or 
technique that accurately reproduces the original.”).  
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witness is also able to testify that the video looks like what they observed. That 
is the method used by HRW. On the other hand, taking the witness’s statement 
may be effective for confirming the authentication of the video by HRW, but 
this is not sufficient authentication later in a court, unless that witness is also 
produced to authenticate the evidence. The ICC may authenticate the video 
based on the testimony of unavailable witnesses, but recognizes that such 
evidence is less reliable, and so a court may give the video evidence less 
weight.136 Where, instead, the witness is not produced, or where the video is 
not posted by the person who took it, then the proponent supports the 
reliability of the evidence using other evidence to verify the posting.137 Of 
course, in the great majority of cases either the eyewitness of what was taken 
on the video or the poster of the video may not be able to be located. This is 
not fatal to the eventual admissibility of the video in that the NGO conflict 
mapping project designed to collect such evidence would most likely also 
gather the circumstantial evidence necessary that will likely still authenticate it 
as evidence.138 
When a witness is unavailable or uncooperative, proving that social media 
content was indeed authored by the user can be a slightly more complicated 
task. Due process, however, provides that circumstantial evidence, including 
“appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
 
 136 See generally Michael P. Scharf, Humanitarian Law-1949 Geneva Conventions-Grave Breaches-Role 
of Serbia in Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 718, 718–21 (1997); ICTY R. P. & Evid. 
92, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Feb. 11, 1994) (as amended Dec. 10, 2009). 
 137 Social media sites are dynamic, complex, and may be unfamiliar to many judges. Testimony about 
how user profiles are created, security procedures, privacy settings, metadata, and general operation may help 
courts to determine whether a satisfactory foundation for authenticity has been laid. Furthermore, courts have 
raised legitimate concerns that social networking accounts may be hacked, fictitious accounts created, and 
accounts left open and unattended. Testimony thus should address those concerns and also explain the degree 
to which the social media in question may have been vulnerable to manipulation. These considerations are 
important both for proffering evidence and for challenging its admissibility. Federal Rule of Evidence 
901(b)(1) allows for authentication through testimony from a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is 
claimed to be. Most straightforwardly, the person who created the evidence can testify to authenticate it. 
Testimony also may be provided by a witness who has personal knowledge of how the social media 
information is typically generated. In such a case, the authenticating witness must provide “factual specificity 
about the process by which the electronically stored information is created, acquired, maintained, and 
preserved without alteration or change, or the process by which it is produced if the result of a system or 
process that does so.” Lorraine v. Market Am. Ins., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555–56 (D. Md. 2007). The social media 
websites themselves, law review articles, and experts can all provide this type of information. 
 138 Witnesses may be fearful to come forward because of retribution by those depicted in the video. See 
SYRIA JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., MAPPING ACCOUNTABILITY EFFORTS IN SYRIA (2013), http://www. 
dchrs.org/english/File/Reports/mapping-accountability-efforts-in-syria.pdf.  
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characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances,” can help 
to authenticate evidence.139 Thus, many paths to authentication exist, subject to 
the type of evidence in question.140 
Take, for example, a promotional video posted by ISIS that shows a 
beheading. First, ISIS’s video posting is often done on a Twitter or Facebook 
page. Social networking sites can include a wealth of information, such as 
profile pages, posts, photographs, and video, as well as several types of 
metadata, some of which are not publicly visible.141 Different types of social 
media evidence will require different indicia of reliability. For example, profile 
pages and posts may require sufficiently distinctive data, such as references 
about which only the author would have known.142 
 
 139 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
 140 Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Authenticating Social Media Evidence, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 2012, 
at 248.  
Social media sites are dynamic, complex, and may be unfamiliar to many judges. Testimony 
about how user profiles are created, security procedures, privacy settings, metadata, and general 
operation may help courts to determine whether a satisfactory foundation for authenticity has 
been laid. Furthermore, courts have raised legitimate concerns that social networking accounts 
may be hacked, fictitious accounts created, and accounts left open and unattended. Testimony 
thus should address those concerns and also explain the degree to which the social media in 
question may have been vulnerable to manipulation. These considerations are important both for 
proffering evidence and for challenging its admissibility. Rule 901(b) (1) allows for 
authentication through testimony from a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is 
claimed to be. Most straightforwardly, the person who created the evidence can testify to 
authenticate it. Testimony also may be provided by a witness who has personal knowledge of 
how the social media information is typically generated. In such a case, the authenticating 
witness must provide “factual specificity about the process by which the electronically stored 
information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without alteration or change, or the 
process by which it is produced if the result of a system or process that does so.” The social 
media websites themselves, law review articles, and experts can all provide this type of 
information.  
Id. 
 141 See id.; Key Facebook Metadata Fields Lawyers and eDiscovery Professionals Need to be Aware of, 
NEXT GEN EDISCOVERY LAW & TECH BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:06 AM), http://blog.x1discovery.com/2011/10/
11/key-facebook-metadata-fields-lawyers-and-ediscovery-professionals-need-to-be-aware-of/ [hereinafter Key 
Facebook Metadata Fields].  
 142 Relevant factors include whether the person to whom the proponent of the exhibit wishes to attribute 
the printout has adopted the username shown on the profile page; whether the person has shared his or her 
social media password with other people; whether there is a photograph on the person’s or entity’s profile page 
that identifies the person to whom the proponent wishes to attribute the posting; and whether there is personal 
information on the profile page, such as a birthday, unique name, or other pedigree information that 
corresponds to known information for the person to whom the proponent wishes to attribute the posting. 
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Circumstantial evidence visible on the social media site, if it provides 
enough content and context, also may be sufficient for authentication. This 
could include, for example, a combination of photographs, video, comments, 
email addresses, and posting dates. Related data from other sources also may 
provide context to aid authentication, including email notifications of posting 
activity, and computer and account usage logs. Metadata, such as location, user 
identification numbers, IP addresses, and when messages were created or 
revised can provide context as well.143 
What would happen if the video has been taken down, or there is evidence 
that it has been obscured in an attempt to hide the identity of the original taker 
of the video?144 Obviously, there are good reasons why victims may want to 
obscure their identity when initially posting the video. They may worry that the 
regime may itself be looking for evidence of victims so as to intimidate or 
remove them from being able to bring evidence against them. So, how could 
such videos be authenticated? Again, the primary tools for authentication are 
the self-authenticating nature of the videos (that barrel bombs look like those 
in the photo, and chemical plumes look like the ones shown in the video), and 
then corroboration by other circumstantial evidence (serial numbers on the 
bomb can be traced to bombs sold by a known arms dealer to the Syrian 
government before the incident where they were used). 
On the other hand, a tech savvy criminal defense lawyer would advise that 
any video taken by an accused be taken down. Any video a prosecutor 
produces for admission a lawyer may thereafter attack by suggesting 
challenges to its authentication. The defendant might show how that video can 
be altered and edited since it has been posted, or, additionally, at the time of its 
posting. Application software, for example, can alter the metadata that 
accompanies any video posted on YouTube from its very beginning posting. 
The metadata can put a false time, place, and date simply by programming the 
camera to post the wrong information when first posted.145 Other applications 
 
 143 See Boehning & Toal, supra note 140.  
 144 See, e.g., Umberto Bacchi, Isis: French Jihadist Mickael Dos Santos ‘Denies Appearing in Beheading 
Video,’ INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/isis-french-jihadist-mickael-dos-santos-
denies-appearing-beheading-video-1475833.  
 145 See, e.g., ObscuraCam: Secure Smart Camera, GUARDIAN PROJECT, https://guardianproject.info/apps/
obscuracam/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
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can be shown to add or remove images in a video by editing out or adding in 
other pictures.146 
Circumstantial evidence can help in this regard. Expert testimony that 
examines the initial downloaded file may provide evidence that no such editing 
or obscuring software was evidenced in the original posting. The absence of 
certain metadata tags can prove the negative, that these videos were not 
altered.147 
Again, while other circumstantial evidence can likely be offered to 
overcome these challenges, an archivist interested in authenticating the video 
offered at a dispute resolution hearing will do their best to download the 
original video when they first put it in their archives.148 The archivist may use 
software such as Checksum,149 which gives a proponent of the evidence an 
ability to provide a mathematical code when they initially download the file, to 
then show the one they are offering is the same as that downloaded one. If the 
proponent can show that the download occurs before the defendant had a 
chance to remove or alter the file, or someone else may have had the chance to 
do so, then the proponent has a better case for authentication. 
Social media evidence is most likely to be admitted at trial when it is 
obtained through formal discovery requests made to the opponent or accused 
subject to a lawful search. Where such a process is impossible, thoroughly 
documenting and verifying the process and results of social media data 
collection can help the evidence withstand authentication challenges.150 The 
simplest method is to capture and preserve static images taken from social 
media sites. In addition, downloading the video to one’s own system, and then 
documenting the download, can also be an important way to preserve the 
video. These images may be difficult to authenticate without testimony based 
on personal knowledge.151 A conflict mapper should create a system for its 
downloading that will establish the use of a “custodian of records” that would 
be able to lay the foundation that the video is authentic. 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 See Key Facebook Metadata Fields, supra note 141. 
 148 Podcasts and Downloadable Videos, INTERACTIVE ARCHIVIST, http://interactivearchivist.archivists.
org/technologies/podcasts/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) (describing methods of downloading original videos). 
 149 SOURCEFORGE, http://checksumchecker.sourceforge.net/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). 
 150 See Boehning & Toal, supra note 140; supra note 132 and accompanying map. 
 151 Key Facebook Metadata Fields, supra note 141. 
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Collecting metadata for use at trial may require specialized software. 
Printouts, screen captures, and video saves and most archive tools will not 
provide all of the available metadata.152 Working with Google, a conflict 
mapper might develop the tools to download and collect content to better 
capture and preserve the unique metadata fields associated with social 
media.153 
Despite altruistic intentions, NGOs must be careful of privacy and other 
ethical concerns when collecting information from social networks.154 
Essentially, NGO researchers should adopt best practices approaches in their 
collection of videos, perhaps acting like attorneys and taking care to avoid 
conduct that could be considered “pretexting” or deceptive as proscribed by 
court rules of professional conduct.155 
Beyond the unique issues of authentication and ethics, social media 
evidence also must clear evidentiary hurdles such as relevance and hearsay. 
“Such issues, however, are generally more susceptible to traditional reasoning 
and evidentiary standards.”156 In fact, electronic communications, such as 
emails, “lend themselves to novel uses of hearsay exceptions.”157 Hearsay is an 
out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.158 
Exceptions include present sense impressions, excited utterances, and then-
existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions, for example.159 Facebook 
status updates, public posts, chat transcripts, Tweets, and more lend themselves 
well to such exceptions. Litigators who keep these exceptions in mind may be 
able to find creative ways to overcome the hearsay hurdle to admissibility. 
It is important to note, as a legal matter, that little help is likely to come 
from a prosecutor’s subpoenaing of third party vendors like Google and 
 
 152 See id.  
 153 Google has the technology to help a mapper establish authenticity by, for example, generating hash 
values (unique document identifiers) for collected social media items and automatically creating collection 
logs. See generally Download Your Data, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3024190?hl=
en (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
 154 Boehning & Toal, supra note 140, at 248. 
 155 This guidance provided by state bar associations is not binding, but does suggest best practices that 
will help attorneys avoid ethical pitfalls that may taint evidence and destroy admissibility. See generally 
MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 7.1 (1983). 
 156 Boehning & Toal, supra note 140.  
 157 Id. 
 158 FED. R. EVID. § 801(c). 
 159 FED. R. EVID. § 803(1)–(3). 
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others.160 While the discoverability analysis is a product of the common law, 
there is at least one statute relevant to the discussion. In the U.S., the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) limits the ability of Internet-service providers to 
voluntarily disclose information about their customers and subscribers.161 
Although providers may disclose electronic communications with the consent 
of the subscriber, the SCA does not contain an exception for disclosure 
pursuant to civil discovery subpoena.162 The application of the SCA to 
discovery of communications stored on social-networking sites has produced 
mixed results.163 
Providers, including Facebook, take the position that the SCA prohibits 
them from disclosing social media contents, even by subpoena. Facebook’s 
website says that “[f]ederal law does not allow private parties to obtain account 
contents (ex: messages, Timeline posts, photos), using subpoenas.”164 
Specifically, the SCA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, prohibits Facebook from disclosing 
the contents of an account to any non-governmental entity pursuant to a 
subpoena or court order.165  
The SCA does not override a party’s obligation to produce relevant 
electronically stored information in a criminal proceeding.166 To the contrary, a 
party must produce evidence of a crime that is within its possession, custody, 
or control.167 Thus, a U.S. court can compel a party to execute an authorization 
for the release of social media content. With an executed authorization, a 
 
 160 See generally Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).  
 161 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2013). 
 162 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c). 
 163 See generally Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 965.  
 164 See May I Obtain Any Account Information or Account Contents Using a Subpoena?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/133221086752707 (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).  
 165 One of the earliest cases to address the issue, Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., concluded that the 
SCA prohibited a social-networking site from producing a user’s account contents in response to a civil 
discovery subpoena. Crispin, 717 F. Supp. at 991. In that case, the defendants served subpoenas on several 
third parties, including Facebook and MySpace, seeking communications between the plaintiff and another 
individual. Id. at 968–69. The plaintiff moved to quash the subpoenas. Id. at 969. The court held that plaintiff 
had standing to bring the motion, explaining that “an individual has a personal right in information in his or 
her profile and inbox on a social-networking site and his or her webmail inbox in the same way that an 
individual has a personal right in employment and bank records.” Id. at 974. Moreover, the court determined 
that the providers were electronic communication service (ECS) providers under the SCA, id. at 982, 989, and 
were thus prohibited from disclosing information contained in “electronic storage,” id. at 989.  
 166 See generally Paul W. Grimm et al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. 
and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. REV. 357 (2009). 
 167 Id. at 413. 
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properly issued subpoena, and, in most cases, a reasonably small payment for 
associated costs, litigants can obtain all information related to a user’s social 
media account.168 How this plays out in a criminal proceeding is subject to 
debate.169 What is left even more ambiguous is the ability of a court like the 
ICC or some foreign national court to exercise jurisdiction over these third 
party vendors and order them to turn over their electronically stored evidence 
as evidence of a crime. One could imagine that in the U.S., where national 
security interests were at stake, subpoenas to obtain such evidence might be 
forthcoming. One wonders whether an interim Syrian court’s issuance of 
subpoena could have the same impact on Google’s duty to produce its data. 
The ubiquity of social networking sites, and the amount of personal 
information they contain, makes them a fertile source of potential evidence. 
However, the cloud-based, transient, and collaborative nature of these sites 
poses challenges unique to these mediums. At the start of a case, international 
NGOs should consider methods of data collection that will help to ensure 
authentication. Carefully documenting the process of data gathering, and using 
sophisticated software where necessary, will help to ensure that the fruits of 
discovery are not excluded from evidence due to a failure of authentication.170 
Under the ICC and under an inquisitorial system of justice, the use of 
hearsay and other evidence is governed by a broader standard of relevance. 
The evidence is not rendered inadmissible if it lacks firsthand knowledge, 
foundation or authentication, but is given less weight if it lacks any of these 
indicia of reliability.171 As a result, in proceedings conducted by the ICC, less 
in the way of authentication for admissibility might be required. In addition, 
Syrian courts, following civil court procedures most likely will also require 
less in the way of authentication of the videos. The alleged expertise of the 
court would allow it to make its own determination of the relevance of the 
 
 168 Id.  
 169 Id.  
 170 See id. at 370–71. 
 171 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. 
S/25704, at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); ICTY R. P. & Evid. 89(C), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Feb. 11, 1994) (as amended 
Dec. 10, 2009). See also Press Release, United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, Tadic Case: The Verdict, U.N. Press Release CC/PIO/190-E (May 7, 1997), 
http://www.icty.org/en/press/tadic-case-verdict. 
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video, with as much of a worry that it will be prejudiced by seeing the video 
before judging finally its authentication. 
If the Syrians choose a formal judicial process, either by using the ICC, a 
Supreme Constitutional Court given jurisdiction over those not granted 
amnesty, or a hybrid court—part Syrian and part international—it will have 
much of the evidence it may need to connect individual actors with individual 
acts of murder and indiscriminate use of force.172 Of course, the defense might 
raise the “Nuremberg Defense,” that the person responsible for using chemical 
weapons, beheading a person, or killing innocent civilians, was ordered to 
commit the act by someone who would kill him or his family if he did not so 
act.173 These will present important issues for the tribunal to decide and will 
raise the possibility that the defendant will likely not be found guilty. On the 
other hand, there would not be the possibility most often raised in past cases 
where the individual denies any knowledge of or involvement in the act 
allegedly committed.174 For example, an NGO conflict mapping project likely 
includes the coding and preservation of YouTube videos and their 
correspondence with evidence of other reports of surrounding events in similar 
locations. Such evidence presents the possibility that the truth will be known, 
and therefore that any reconciliation that might occur will be based on a better 
understanding of who did what to whom. 
B. Use of Social Media Evidence by TRCs or Local Informal Mediation 
Bodies 
Just as in cases where a TRC process has gathered witness statements from 
victims, the use of corroborating evidence can test the truth of what a particular 
accused says at a TRC proceeding where he or she is allegedly confessing the 
extent of their past doings and sincerely asking for forgiveness.175 Here, 
however, the corroborating evidence comes from public sources and so can be 
used without violating promises made to the witness during the gathering of 
the information. 
 
 172 President Assad denies using barrel bombs or chemical weapons, or targeting civilians in any way. See 
Syria Conflict: BBC Exclusive Interview with President Bashar al-Assad, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31327153.  
 173 Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court Versus 
Customary International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 172, 174 (1999).  
 174 Id.  
 175 See generally Michael P. Scharf, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 593, 718–21 (1997). 
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The importance of this kind of evidence should not be overlooked for 
judging the efficacy of an informal TRC or other local mediation process. One 
of the most important tradeoffs between formal and informal dispute resolution 
processes is whether the truth really can ever be known through either process, 
and therefore whether appealing to a person’s desire to be reconciled will 
produce a true confession of guilt. The informal process is chosen in order to 
provide the individual accused with the choice of confessing or facing a formal 
judicial proceeding. The reality has been that such a choice is made often with 
the almost certain knowledge that, in refusing to testify, the formal process will 
be sufficiently delayed, and the capacity of the formal prosecution will be 
thereafter so compromised that no proceeding will likely take place.176 The 
ability of an interim period dispute resolution process to use the conflict 
mapping information is helpful in two ways. First, it helps the Syrians assess 
the truthfulness of what the individual accused may say he or she did during a 
truth and reconciliation process. Second, it allows for the involvement of 
victims of those acts to directly confront the accused and better creates the 
possibilities of meaningful forgiveness and reconciliation. This is because true 
forgiveness and reconciliation will necessarily involve the victims of those 
actors’ wrongdoings. The victims need to understand what was done and why 
to truly be able to choose to set it aside and forgive, while not forgetting. The 
forgiveness cannot be mandated or dictated by the peacemaking process. For 
true forgiveness to occur it must be freely given. Otherwise the resentment 
likely to remain in the victims and their families may cause a return to 
violence, should the perpetrators stay in the locality. 
For Syrian peacemakers, the use of social media may be an important 
consideration for deciding whether it will grant immunity for certain acts, to 
whom it will grant immunity, and, in addition, which kind of dispute resolution 
systems it will adopt for which kind of disputes. The resolution system may 
very well suggest that immunity be given to Assad and/or key military figures 
in exchange for an end to the conflict, a set time for transitioning out of 
leadership, immediate removal from their involvement in the government, 
and/or their leaving Syria altogether. For those that remain, the question will 
be, more specifically put, what was their individual responsibility for the use of 
 
 176 The use of TRCs in Liberia and Kenya produced no referrals to formal judicial proceedings, and 
impunity for those who choose not to submit to the process. Neela Ghoshal, Four Years After Kenya’s Post-
Election Violence, Impunity Reigns, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/09/
four-years-after-kenya-s-post-election-violence-impunity-reigns. 
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barrel bombs, chemical weapons, torture tactics, or the disappearance of 
civilians. These individuals may be tried according to formal procedures that 
provide due process protections. Alternatively, they could face a TRC process. 
The individuals could make that choice knowing that some conflict mapping 
evidence might be available that will test the sincerity of their confessions, as 
well as the impact on victims and the victims’ willingness to forgive. 
For those others—ISIS, al Qaeda, or other opposition group members—a 
different dispute resolution process might be employed. First, it must be 
recognized that the number of ISIS members who would likely remain or 
survive after the conflict is over between opposition groups and the Assad 
government is likely to be a small number. Those that do not die in conflict 
may try to flee to reform in a different setting. Those opposition groups 
members who remain likely will be those who have participated in the armed 
conflict in an attempt to fight what they may have thought was an illegitimate 
government at war with its own citizens. Still there may be accusations that 
some of these individuals were engaged in criminal acts and perpetrated war 
crimes during the conflict. Again, these individuals might be subject to dispute 
resolution processes if victims come forward to seek some sort of justice for 
what was done to them by these people. In these cases a more informal local or 
regional-led dispute resolution process might be employed. The peacemakers 
might decide that these individuals should be brought before existing Islamic 
courts or local councils to consider what they did and why they did it. 
In either case, what can result from the existence of this evidence is that 
Syrian courts and mediators can obtain a more accurate and complete 
understanding of the nature of the accused’s acts and the effects on the victims. 
Armed with such information, the tribunal can better assess the truthfulness of 
any confession that is given and the sincerity of the person’s remorse. As a 
result, victims can also be more readily identified and brought into the 
reconciliation process, and the possibility of meaningful reconciliation can be 
more readily provided for. In addition, the international community can more 
readily assist in this reconciliation process without intruding on whomever is 
making the decision, or what punishment, compensation, or ritual of 
confession is provided for. 
CONCLUSION 
Any transition that Syria will face will have to navigate through a number 
of potential obstacles on the way to a sustainable peace. The first obstacle will 
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be what Syrians will decide to do about those who may have committed past 
atrocities, including Assad, members of his military and security forces, as 
well as any of the rebel groups that also engaged in war crimes.177 A legal 
strategy that will require Assad to power share, on a way toward a more 
democratic form of government that is inclusive of all tribal and religious 
groups, will likely have to include both prisoner releases and some sort of 
amnesty for top leaders. The remaining disputes between Syrian citizen victims 
and the perpetrators of violence during the interim period will have to be 
handled by both informal, and then formal means. Perhaps the best mix of 
dispute resolution will include both informal dispute resolution mechanisms 
that draw on local leadership to help resolve them, followed by more formal 
methods—most probably hybrid regional courts run by both Syrians and 
international players committed to both the continued peaceful resolution of 
these disputes, and the building of religious freedoms and minority protections 
to keep the “winners” from seeking retribution and imposing their will on the 
“losers.” 
Surprisingly, the role that social media will play will most likely 
complicate the transition for peacemakers. As we have seen, social media has a 
positive impact on peacemaking in at least two ways. First, it helps 
humanitarian groups identify those rebels who may have engaged in war 
crimes, which avoids giving aid and assistance to the wrong parties both during 
the conflict and during the transition. Second, social media also helps post-
conflict to match accused war criminals with victims in a way that may bring 
about more truth speaking, and more forgiveness and reconciliation. 
What is complicating the process is that social media also makes possible 
the more successful prosecution of those who have committed war crimes. 
How can peacemakers make promises of amnesty to those disputants who are 
likely war criminals when they know that evidence from social media may lead 
others to want to prosecute them for their crimes? The “fog of war” may have 
lifted sufficiently so that the nature of the choices available to Syrians presents 
an overwhelming ethical dilemma to the possibility of making peace. How will 
Syrians resolve the choice between peace and justice, or decide who to give 
amnesty to, and who they should insist on prosecuting in order to insure that, 
in the future, no Syrian actor uses war crimes to promote self and tribe? 
 
 177 See infra Part II. 
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What is clear is that peacemakers need to be careful not to be seen as 
gathering evidence for prosecution, otherwise their role as peacemaker will be 
compromised. At the same time, social media evidence can serve two different 
purposes in two different phases of the peace process after the conflict has 
stopped. In the first phase, the evidence from social media can be used to bring 
about mediations that lead to better reconciliations. In the second phase, where 
reconciliation has not occurred because the perpetrators are neither forthright 
nor sincere in their participation in the mediation, evidence from social media 
sources can be made available to prosecute in more formal judicial settings. 
Justification for its use comes in the form of classic evidentiary principles 
based on reliable foundations, relevance, and authentication. In the process of 
their recruitment of others to their side of the conflict, there should be little 
hesitation by hybrid courts to use such evidence to bring these war criminals to 
justice, especially where such evidence is produced by recalcitrant groups 
themselves.  
 
